"The regime change unfolded much quicker after the elections than we expected,” Ági Fernengel, executive director of Közélet Iskolája (School of Public Life), a Hungarian NGO supporting democratic participation and social movements, told me about her country’s recent political about-face.
“The oppressive systems crumbled in a few weeks in front of our eyes, even before the new government took office.”
Viktor Orbán was a global flag bearer for right-wing populism and authoritarianism until his defeat in April. Now Hungary could serve as a blueprint and ongoing experiment to ask how we create democracy after authoritarianism.
Like many Hungarians, Fernengel was surprised when Orbán conceded early on election night. Péter Magyar and his party Tisza won 71%, making him Hungary's new Prime Minister – and giving the party over the two-thirds parliamentary majority needed to change the constitution.
“I think all these doubts [that Orbán would lose] show how much the system was embedded in our minds. The regime really got into our souls, making it difficult to imagine anything else,” Fernengel told me by phone.
Before the 2026 election, Közélet Iskolája worked with human rights groups and social movements on different scenarios. For instance, an Orbán victory looked likely to bring forward a planned ban on opposition NGOs and media, while his defeat could open the first stage of democratisation.
She explained, “We can effectively change the country and stand up for the interests of those who are oppressed for so long, [like] with the disability movement organizations or women's organizations.”
Undoing Orbán's influence
Pressure from across Hungarian society pushed the President Tamás Sulyok to step down in July.
“There was a consensus that the president should be removed as he was a servant of the previous regime,” Fernengel said. “His role is symbolic, with some checks and balances. The prime minister holds the main power.
“Yet this needed to be done democratically so it did not set an anti-democratic precedent for the future. It is still debated whether this procedure was democratic enough.”
Any country moving from authoritarianism towards democracy faces a dilemma: getting rid of the unjust system quickly, whilst moving slowly enough to do this legally. Even with the authoritarian prime minister and president of Hungary gone, many judges and other pro-Orbán people remain in high places – some of whom will stay in position until after the next general elections.
Sociologist Kim Lane Scheppele examined how difficult it is to move beyond authoritarianism, particularly when a leader has had two or more terms in office.
Orbán had four. Question marks over Magyar
Magyar, a former Orbán insider, broke with the regime in 2024 to become a leading opposition voice after protests accused the regime of covering up systemic child abuse.
With political roots that started in Orbán's party—and as the ex-husband of the justice minister who granted the pardon that was uncovered in this scandal—Magyar’s political platform during the election did not massively diverge from Orbán's, except for his rejection of corruption and cronyism.
Yet in its first few months in office, Magyar’s government has made many progressive first steps. These include splitting up the key roles of government and putting progressive voices in important roles; starting to undo the authoritarian controls on Hungary's education system; and setting up a new government office against corruption.
In another progressive step, abortion rights are now being discussed, something unimaginable under Orbán.
When I asked Fernengel how social movement participants and Hungarians in general who want a progressive future are feeling, her answer was nuanced. The new government has clearly inspired a great deal of hope and is exceeding expectations, she said. But this is tempered with wariness that Magyar and Tisza do not themselves become authoritarian.
Hungary also faces massive challenges. Orbán took a country in crisis, caused by neoliberalism, and made things worse. For example, he marginalized many Hungarians, oppressed opposition groups, and failed to lift scores of people out of poverty—situations that have only deepened the crises caused by recent geopolitics.
Rebuilding Hungary from the ground up
Tisza is a broad church of anti-Orbán interests that could transform into separate chapters. The Parliament is made up of this party with both the old party of Orbán (Fidesz) and another far-right party waiting in the wings.
From a pro-democratic perspective, civil society and new media organisations are surging. Fernengel explained that even though Magyar didn’t challenge Orbán on progressive issues, civil society became more emboldened as the regime was being confronted.
Hungary's Pride event in 2025 was one example.
“300,000 people marched for Pride in Budapest,” Fernengel said. “It was a really important step in actually believing that the system can be changed. It was banned, yet as it was so successful it transformed people’s imagination.”
The election campaign itself also catalyzed political engagement.
"During the campaign, so many people started organising in groups called 'Tisza Islands.’ These groups involved tens of thousands of activists across the country, yet also followed the direction of the Tisza campaign strictly in the months leading up to the elections," Fernengel explained.
“Now these local islands are looking for their own paths forward in lack of a clear central direction and wanting to keep active in public life after experiencing the power of organizing. Many are turning towards community organizing and becoming advocacy groups. Some are thinking about running in local elections to take control of their town's future.”
Orbán oppressed social movements, and Fernengel suggested this clearly in the demographic of activists in Hungary overall, which has even fewer people from precarious working class backgrounds, compared to elsewhere.
At 33, she has never known democracy in her adult life and said that many experienced activists are burned out, with people new to organising full of energy but inexperienced. Adding to this, the new government is recruiting many people into the new ministries, including progressive people, too, causing a “brain drain” for social movements and NGOs.
Transforming Hungary's government and institutions, with economic measures to tackle economic marginalisation and poverty along with social movements working with the new government, will be essential for Hungary to revive democracy. It cannot simply solve the crisis caused by Orbán, but the underlying conditions that enabled his 16 years of rule.
I first interviewed Fernengel in 2023 about the organisation's work supporting progressive independent candidates under Orbán, for a documentary for the European Municipalist Network.
Looking ahead for Közélet Iskolája, Fernengel explained there is a great deal more work to do — not least creating a cultural revolution to back the political revolution.
“There is a new democratic culture to build, not simply institutional reform,” she said. “Redemocratisation cannot depend solely on politicians; it must come from civil society, movements and citizens creating new relationships, expectations and ways of participating in public life.”
“After years of fear and restrictions on organising, people are relearning how to advocate, resist and engage with the government. But this should not mean returning to the old system [that brought Orbán into power], which also contained injustice and undemocratic practices,” Fernengel added.
“The coming years are an opportunity to experiment and establish new democratic norms. Instead of relying on personal connections to solve local problems, citizens can build coalitions and advocate for systemic change.”
